1. INTRODUCTION
Turkey’s geographical and geopolitical position confers upon the country a singular role in the contemporary international system. Situated between Europe and Asia, Turkey performs strategic functions on several fronts: it is a member of NATO (external link), a historical candidate for the European Union, a regional power in the Middle East and the Caucasus, and a key actor in multilateral negotiations.
This multiplicity of engagements, however, is not accompanied by a linear or predictable foreign policy. While this positioning expands the country’s prominence, it also challenges traditional molds of multilateralism and raises questions about the cohesion of regional blocs and institutions.
Against this backdrop, the following research question arises: How did Turkey’s domestic political transformations, between the periods of Atatürk and Erdoğan, influence its foreign policy and its engagement in regional integration processes?
The main objective of this study is to analyze how domestic political changes shape foreign policy and, consequently, the Turkish state’s involvement in regional arrangements. As specific objectives, it proposes to investigate how transformations in regime and national identity impacted foreign policy formulation and to assess the role of political actors and institutions in redefining Turkey’s international interests, in order to understand how the regionalism strategies adopted by the country reflect its domestic context.
The choice of this topic is justified by the need to understand how domestic factors, often overlooked in foreign policy analysis, are central to defining the paths of states aspiring to regional leadership. To this end, an introduction to the historical and theoretical context of regional integration processes and foreign policy analysis will be presented, highlighting their relevance for understanding the Turkish state’s domestic political transformations. Subsequently, regime change and the policies adopted under the governments of Atatürk and Erdoğan will be analyzed, reflecting on their international engagement.
To achieve the objectives outlined in this study, a qualitative analysis will be conducted. The primary approach involved bibliographic and documentary research, emphasizing a theoretical-argumentative character. The literature review drew on academic works addressing domestic factors as catalysts of foreign policy. In addition, key concepts were highlighted for theoretical discussion, particularly in relation to the literature on regional integration processes.
2. FROM THE INSIDE OUT: THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO REGIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY
Over the decades, Turkish governments have adopted distinct strategies of external engagement: at times seeking rapprochement with the West and the European Union, at other times prioritizing strategic relations with the Islamic world and the Turkic peoples. Such oscillations cannot be understood apart from domestic political transformations, which alter not only perceived national interests but also the state’s international identity. In this sense, the case of Turkey proves emblematic for understanding the relationships between domestic politics and regional integration processes.
To this end, it is first necessary to understand how regional integration processes are formed. According to Hurrell (1995), the definition of region and the dynamics of regionalism are not easily delimited, which is why geographical proximity and contiguity are important factors in distinguishing regionalism from other forms of organization. For him, definitions of region may vary and the dynamics of regionalism refer to a variety of processes, namely: regionalization, regional awareness and identity, regional economic integration, regional cohesion, and interstate regional cooperation.
As the latter is of primary interest in this article, it is worth highlighting that interstate cooperation can be formal or informal, and high levels of institutionalization do not guarantee effectiveness or political importance. That is, on the one hand, cooperation may be a response to external challenges and to the need to adjust regional positions in international institutions or negotiating forums. On the other, it can be established to ensure welfare, promote values, or resolve common problems, particularly those related to growing levels of regional interdependence (Hurrell, 1995).
It is important to emphasize that, unlike certain types of regional integration, these instruments of cooperation are clearly statist, designed to protect and enhance state action and governmental power. Furthermore, they involve the reassertion and extension of state authority as part of a process in which states are increasingly willing to trade a certain degree of sovereignty for greater influence over the policies of other states and over the management of common problems.
Therefore, the author emphasizes that regional cooperation is vulnerable to the domestic politics of individual states, given that heads of government prioritize their national interests, which directly influence their level of commitment. To demonstrate this, he presents three ways of linking domestic factors to regionalism: regionalism and state coherence, convergence theories, and regime type and democratization.
The first refers to the coherence and viability of states and state structures that determine the possibilities for regional cooperation and integration. It is understood that most major post–Cold War problems are related not to a lack of legitimacy between states, but within them. The absence of effective state apparatuses and mutually accepted territorial boundaries hinders the region-building process, if not rendering it impossible (Hurrell, 1995). Thus, regional organizations serve as important mechanisms for legitimacy and support for leaders of fragile societies, where political instability, regime breakdowns, economic mismanagement, and environmental degradation are recurrent (Mesquita, 2019).
The second, in turn, seeks to understand the dynamics of regional cooperation through the convergence of domestic policy preferences among states in the region. Convergence, therefore, emerges from the implementation of nationally—rather than internationally—focused policies that may result in strengthening the role of the state. Thus, trade liberalization and export expansion, marked by liberal market policies, were outcomes of this social, political, and economic convergence (Hurrell, 1995).
Lastly, the importance of domestic factors, such as political stability and democratization processes, is highlighted for the advancement of regional integration and cooperation mechanisms. It is understood, therefore, that changes in the domestic arena directly impact regional integration and cooperation processes. States with weak institutional structures are incapable of fostering effective cooperation processes or sustaining their regional organizations.
Furthermore, a country’s regime type significantly influences its involvement in regionalism (Hurrell, 1995). Foreign policy, in this sense, is deeply influenced by the electoral process, as discussed by Onuki and Oliveira (2013), wherein the preferences of leaders and political parties are shaped according to domestic interests, especially regarding the need to cater to interest groups, political coalitions, or constituency demands.
According to Hermann (1990), changes in government frequently result in significant shifts in foreign policy. The author classifies these shifts into four levels: adjustment, program, goal, and orientation. Adjustment refers to minor changes in policy implementation without altering underlying foundations. Program change involves modifying the strategies or instruments used to achieve previously defined goals. Goal change, in turn, entails redefining the goals guiding foreign policy. Finally, international orientation change corresponds to a broader transformation that alters the core principles and values underpinning a country’s foreign policy.
For Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007), these changes are deeply tied to domestic factors, such as the rise of new governments with different agendas, alterations in the international power structure, or pressures from internal and external actors. This approach allows for an understanding of how changes in government can reorient foreign policy, redefining priorities and strategies as a function of new coalitions and political demands.
Thus, it is possible to observe that elections play a crucial role in foreign policy formulation, as they determine the values and priorities of elected leaders, which frequently reflect the interests and demands of their electorates. This highlights the importance of analyzing domestic factors and changes of government in order to understand foreign policy dynamics and their relationship with regional integration and cooperation processes (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2007).
It is thus evident that regional theories become relevant for understanding this phenomenon because they prioritize the particularities of each region, considering that regionalism is not only the result of external pressures, but also of factors intrinsic to the region itself by highlighting the historical, cultural, and social ties among States. In other words, this approach analyzes how regionalism processes are articulated to shape the regional phenomenon (Hurrell, 1995).
This is why the theoretical approach of intergovernmentalism, proposed by Andrew Moravcsik (1998), offers a more suitable lens by considering that national preferences are formed internally, based on domestic coalitions, and are subsequently projected onto the international stage in a bottom-up dynamic (bottom-up). This theory recognizes the weight of domestic dynamics—such as elections, changes in government, ideologies, and institutional disputes—in conducting regional policy. In the Turkish case, the alternation between secular, military, and Islamist governments reveals the impact of domestic political configurations on the country’s external orientation.
In this way, foreign policy formulation can also be understood through theories that emphasize the role of domestic variables. The Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) approach emphasizes internal decision-making processes, leaders, institutions, and identity construction as drivers of external action (Hudson, 2005). State identity—that is, how leaders perceive themselves and their place in the international system—is a key element in explaining foreign policy choices, especially in States undergoing political transition.
In this sense, Turkey’s foreign policy is an excellent example for analyzing how conceptions of “national role” (Holsti, 1970) shape international conduct. The author proposes that States act based on roles they construct for themselves, which can change over time due to domestic transformations. During the early republican era, under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey adopted a role conception centered on the modernizer and sovereign defender, prioritizing domestic consolidation, secular modernization, and non-interventionism. Foreign policy was marked by caution, seeking to avoid involvement in international conflicts while reinforcing a Western-leaning identity.
However, the country has reshaped this role with the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP), seeking to assert itself as an Islamic and Eurasian regional power, which implies a significant shift in its regional integration orientation. The AKP era redefined Turkey's international role to reflect both an Ottoman historical legacy and a strategic vision of regional influence—particularly in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Africa. For example, Turkey’s mediation efforts between Israel and Syria in the 2000s, its activism in the Syrian and Libyan conflicts, and its involvement in humanitarian aid and Islamic solidarity frame Turkey as a regional stabilizer and protector of Muslim communities (Müftüler-baç, 2020).
The Turkic Council (now the Organization of Turkic States), created in 2009 and strongly promoted over the last decade, is an example of functional regionalism based on ethnolinguistic ties with Turkic-speaking countries in Central Asia. Turkey has also increased its prominence in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and has sought to act as a mediator in regional conflicts, such as in Syria, Azerbaijan, and between Russia and Ukraine.
Therefore, regime changes, the Islamization of politics, presidentialism, and contemporary Turkish nationalism not only influence the country's foreign policy, but also shape the type of regionalism it seeks to foster or even move away from. Thus, analyzing Turkish foreign policy reveals how identity, history, and leadership perceptions shape a State’s engagement with the international system. Integration, in this context, is not a universal end, but a tool shaped by domestic priorities.
3. BETWEEN ATATÜRK AND ERDOĞAN (1923–2024): REGIME RUPTURES AND TURKEY'S REPOSITIONING
Turkey’s domestic politics has undergone radical transformations since the founding of the Republic, shaping its national identity and projecting different worldviews onto foreign policy. This dominant national identity reflects a synthesis between Turkey's Ottoman-Islamic history and culture and its nationalist, secular, Western, and modern traditions, upon which the State was founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923. As a result of this identity shift, Turkey's foreign policy has also changed: “Identity plays a significant role in the construction and implementation of foreign policy” (Bülent, 2004 cited in Fuller, 2007).
Since then, Turkey has struggled to define its national identity, being described as a "torn country" situated between East and West, leaving open the question of which side it will lean toward. However, this article argues that Turkey will not lean toward only one side. Instead, the country has found that it is more beneficial to balance relations on multiple fronts and will continue to maintain this posture as long as it remains in the national interest, as determined by the ruling party (Fuller, 2007).
This foreign policy has influenced Turkey’s national identity because its leaders are engaging regions it had neglected since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Many of these regions are, in fact, what comprised the Ottoman Empire or regions with which it once had close relations. Because the leadership of the Ottoman Empire was also the Islamic Caliphate, Turkey has used its Islamic heritage to court various Islamic States in the Middle East, North Africa, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.
Consequently, it has also used its shared Ottoman history and former influence to build closer ties with the Balkan States. At the same time, Turkey maintains its strong connection with the European Union in the hope of one day becoming a member, improving its relations with a traditional rival, Russia, through the restructuring of energy security agreements, and remaining a partner of the United States, albeit amid recent tensions (Fuller, 2007).
Moreover, national identity itself is never static and is constantly changing. Thus, three fundamental periods stand out: founding Kemalism, the intermediate governments with military interventions, and the Erdoğan era. Each of these moments reconfigured Turkey’s role on the international stage, impacting its engagement in regional integration processes.
With the rise of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Proclamation of the Kemalist Republic (1923–1945), Turkey broke with its Ottoman legacy and embarked on a profound process of Westernization. Kemalist reforms—such as the secularization of the State, the abolition of the caliphate, and the adoption of the Latin alphabet—aimed to build a modern nation integrated into the European system. On the external front, the principles of non-intervention and neutrality guided foreign policy, focusing on domestic stability and territorial sovereignty (Kinross, 2001).
For Kinross (2001), this initial period was marked by strategic isolation: Turkey avoided active regional alliances and maintained a defensive posture. Thus, the priority was to consolidate the new nation-state, and international insertion was instrumental to that goal, with no regional integration project yet in place.
However, with the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, Turkey joined the Western bloc, acceding to NATO in 1952. Despite rapprochements with Europe—including its formal application to the European Union in 1987—Turkish domestic politics was marked by instability, with successive military coups (1960, 1971, 1980) and the strengthening of a secular-militarist elite. During this period, the country oscillated between democratization efforts and authoritarian setbacks. Foreign policy remained aligned with the West, but there was a structural limitation to deep regional integration due to a lack of internal cohesion and constant institutional rupture (Yilmaz, 2005).
Policy toward Cyprus, for example, became a regional flashpoint and one of the greatest obstacles to Turkey’s accession to the EU (Yilmaz, 2005). Düzgün (2019) argues that the island, divided since 1974 following the Turkish military intervention, remains a symbol of the contradictions between Turkish foreign policy and the European Union’s normative values. The non-recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (recognized only by Ankara) and the permanent military presence in the region are persistent points of tension.
The Republic of Cyprus’s accession to the EU in 2004 without resolving the conflict was seen as a betrayal by Turkey, which had supported the Annan Plan for reunification. This Plan was a conflict-resolution initiative sponsored by the UN between 2002 and 2004, on the eve of Cyprus’s accession to the European Union. Kofi Annan led efforts proposing a federal solution for the island, which culminated in the Annan Plan. The clear intention was to resolve the Cyprus issue prior to the country’s entry into the EU (Moulakis, 2007).
Since then, the impasse has hindered progress in accession negotiations and fueled the argument of selective multilateralism on the part of the European Union—which, in the Turkish view, favors member states to the detriment of compromise solutions (Düzgün, 2019). This impasse highlights how domestic dynamics and the construction of Turkish national identity, particularly nationalism and the military’s centrality in foreign policy decision-making, clash with the normative and consensual principles of European regionalism. The Cyprus issue is, therefore, not merely a bilateral obstacle, but an emblem of how political regimes and domestic orientations shape the limits of regional integration.
The Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) rise to power in 2002, led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, marked a new phase in Turkish politics. In the early years, there were democratization efforts and dialogue with the EU, with pro-European reforms that led to the formal opening of accession negotiations in 2005. However, beginning in 2010, a democratic retreat became evident, accentuated after the 2016 coup attempt, when Erdoğan adopted a heavily centralizing and authoritarian profile (Davutoğlu, 2001).
The 2017 constitutional referendum consolidated this process by replacing the parliamentary system with presidentialism. Following this change, the president’s role in foreign policy formulation became predominant, directly reflecting on the conduct of relations with regional neighbors and international organizations (Müftüler-baç, 2020).
Turkish foreign policy, in turn, came to reflect an Islamic and nationalist identity, abandoning the Kemalist ideal of westernization. Erdoğan promoted a policy of “strategic depth” (Davutoğlu, 2001), seeking to expand Turkish influence in the Middle East, the Balkans, and Central Asia. The establishment of the Turkic Council and the emphasis on relations with Muslim-majority countries demonstrate a new regionalist orientation that departs from liberal multilateralism and moves toward a selective and instrumentalized regionalism.
As an important country straddling Eurasia, Turkey is a pivotal state with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to a single category. For Davutoğlu (2001), Turkey must claim a new position in its region, providing security and stability not only for itself, but also for its neighbors and the region as a whole. Turkey’s engagements, from Africa to Central Asia and from the EU to the OIC, are part of a new foreign policy vision. Domestically, Turkey needs to deepen and enrich its democracy, accommodate differences within its society, and strengthen coordination and balance among its institutions.
4. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Turkey’s foreign policy between 1923 and 2024 was heavily conditioned by institutional transformations and domestic disputes over national identity. The comparison between the Kemalist parliamentary regime and the centralizing presidentialism under Erdoğan shows that changes in the political arrangement directly impacted how the country positions itself regionally and internationally.
Meanwhile, presidentialism under Erdoğan consolidated a new logic of Turkish foreign policy formulation, marked by decision-making centralization, diplomatic personalization, and the instrumentalization of regional alliances. The break with the Kemalist parliamentary model—based on secularism, diplomatic caution, and European aspirations—gave way to a more assertive, selective, and identity-driven foreign policy.
The new institutional configuration allowed the Executive to shape external strategies aligned with a neo-Ottoman identity, emphasizing ethno-religious ties and the projection of influence in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa. Initiatives such as the Organization of Turkic States and Turkey’s leading role in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation demonstrate this reorientation. At the same time, the estrangement from the European Union and the impasse surrounding the Cyprus issue reveal the limits and potential of regionalism and regional integration processes in contexts of democratic instability and regime change.
This trajectory confirms that regionalism is neither neutral nor linear: it depends on institutional stability, domestic agendas, and the internal legitimacy of governments. Thus, Turkish foreign policy came to reflect regime priorities rather than enduring commitments to multilateral forums. Therefore, from the Ottoman legacy to contemporary presidentialism, Turkish regionalism has always been an affair of state.