Originally published in 2008, Robert Kagan’s “The Return of History and the End of Dreams” appeared in Brazilian translation only in 2012. Although more than a decade has passed since its original publication, and nearly as long since its Brazilian release, the book has attracted little attention among readers of international relations in Brazil. This is regrettable. In writing about the end of the End of History, Kagan offers a forceful critique of Francis Fukuyama (1989), whose central argument was that the end of the Cold War would mark a watershed in human history because history itself would cease to unfold.
The end of the bipolar rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union generated considerable euphoria in the West about the future of international relations. Following an Aristotelian logic, Fukuyama’s reasoning rests on the following premise: Democracies do not wage war against other democracies. Without communism, democracy would spread throughout the world. A democratic world would therefore be a world without war. Drawing on a Hegelian framework in which history is driven by the master–slave dialectic, Fukuyama reasoned that, since democratic liberalism declares everyone equal, the dichotomy between master and servant would disappear. In this sense, history would end.
Fukuyama was not alone in this assessment. Others anticipated the end of geopolitics (LUTTWAK, 1990), the relegation of nationalism to the past (HASSNER, 1993), the demise of the modern state (MINC, 1993), and a shift in security concerns away from interstate relations toward human security (UNITED NATIONS, 1994). “The modern democratic world wanted to believe that the end of the Cold War had ended not merely one strategic and ideological conflict but all strategic and ideological conflicts” (KAGAN, 2009, p. 3). According to Kagan, the prevailing belief was that human reason, embodied in Enlightenment thought, had triumphed over human savagery.
This savagery finds expression in the Greek concept of thumos,which denotes a fierce, tribal dimension of human nature devoted to the struggle for survival. The West’s profound optimism thus entrenched two convictions: 1) human progress is inevitable, and 2) the worldwide advance of liberalism would itself extinguish the last bastions of authoritarianism. This presumed causal relationship between liberalism and democratization rested on the belief that economic liberalization would produce spillover effects in the political sphere. Yet this is not what happened.
The book opens with the following sentence: “The world has become normal again” (KAGAN, 2009, p. 3). Observing that the End of History’s promises of peace and democratization had failed to materialize during the first decade of the twenty-first century, Kagan argues that they were a mirage: liberalism neither reigns as an uncontested ideology nor will it shape the interests of the great powers for the foreseeable future. His central argument is that competition between liberal democracies and autocracies has returned, while the great powers are aligning their interests with their domestic regimes. He therefore declares that “we have entered an age of divergence” (KAGAN, 2009, p. 4).
He bases this claim on the conduct of three principal powers—Russia, China, and Iran—among other actors on the international geopolitical stage. He identifies Russia as the foremost example of this return of history. After the Cold War, Moscow, the principal successor to the Soviet Union, adopted democracy as its political model and the free market as its economic system. Yet when these changes failed to deliver the expected benefits and instead caused considerable social upheaval, Russia became increasingly authoritarian and increasingly resistant to Western narratives about democracy’s inherent advantages. Regarding China, Kagan argues that economic growth has not translated into greater political freedom but rather into a stronger military, intended to prevent a recurrence of the Century of Humiliation while restoring national pride and power. Iran, in turn, embodies religious resistance to Western values, interpreting them as degenerate concepts that threaten the sovereignty of its theocratic regime.
Kagan further argues that, between 1989 and 2001, the United States forcibly intervened in foreign territories more frequently than during any other period in its history. The combination of American unipolarity and unrivaled power led Washington to embark on a mission not merely to consolidate and reinforce its alliances but also to extend the reach of the liberal international order. The invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, despite opposition from major allies such as France and Germany, thus demonstrated the strength of a country that considered itself indispensable to international order and stability. This exercise of power, coupled with disregard for the constraints of international norms, led major non-Western powers such as China and Russia to regard the United States with suspicion and to view its promotion of democratic ideals as merely a vehicle for projecting power across the globe.
Contemporary multipolarity, together with the political models embraced by today’s great powers, therefore undermines the myth that strategic and ideological conflicts have ended and confirms the return of competing interests. Differences between countries that theoretically inhabit two distinct historical periods—modernity and postmodernity—can create serious obstacles to resolving conflicts and tensions. One example Kagan offers concerns the European Union and Russia. Whereas the former comes closest to embodying a postmodern political reality today—with a diminished role for state borders, a departure from territorial logic, a strong emphasis on economic affairs, and liberal democracy—Russia continues to inhabit a modern reality, characterized by expansionist impulses, territorial annexation, an emphasis on military strength, and the absence of certain democratic civil liberties. These divergent understandings of what constitutes strategy and threat can lead to miscommunication between the two sides, creating the potential for conflict.
Moreover, China, Russia, and Iran are not autocratic merely out of expediency or opposition to the liberal system. Robert Kagan argues that their leaders believe in autocracy. Alongside this conviction is their clear rejection of the supposedly inherent universality of liberal values. In these leaders’ view, human rights, democracy, freedom of the press, and women’s emancipation are products of liberal Western society and nothing more. As Kagan puts it, “the United States and its allies have succeeded in imposing their views on others not because they are right but only because they are powerful enough to do so. To non-liberals, the liberal international order is not progress. It is oppression” (KAGAN, 2009, p. 67).
Another development contradicting the premises of the End of History concerns the expectation that the remaining bastions of authoritarianism, or any other nonliberal ideology, could not survive in an increasingly liberal world because they would be excluded from the processes generating wealth and technological progress. Reality has not borne this out. The countries discussed above, especially China, demonstrate that even without pursuing a free-market ideal or adopting a democratic model of government, states can excel in certain areas of technological innovation and economic growth and show no signs of approaching their demise. This suggests that liberalism is not a prerequisite for success within a liberal international order. These alternative models of economic and social organization have also proved attractive to smaller nations that struggle to align their bureaucratic and political institutions with Western values.
These emerging perspectives and organizational possibilities broaden the range of values available to governments. Kagan quotes Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to illustrate this shift: “For the first time in many years, a genuinely competitive environment has emerged in the marketplace of ideas,” encompassing “value systems and development models” (KAGAN, 2009, p. 70). This recognition of alternative ideas is central to Russian thinking about a multipolar world. Unlike classical approaches that consider only actors’ power capabilities (KEOHANE, 2005; KISSINGER, 1994; MEARSHEIMER, 2001), the Russian understanding also incorporates “competition among systems of values and ideas […]” (KAGAN, 2009, p. 71).
Toward the end of the book, Kagan argues that the liberal character of the international system is at risk as non-Western, nonliberal powers assume a more prominent role in the concert of nations. Observing that “international order rests not only on ideas and institutions” but is also “shaped by configurations of power” (KAGAN, 2009, p. 96), he suggests that powers such as Russia and China could alter the character of the institutions and organizations responsible for sustaining the post–Second World War international order. He then seeks to offer a solution to what he regards as a problem.
Concerned about the condition of democracy worldwide, Kagan proposes that democracies establish mechanisms to “protect their interests and defend their principles in a world in which these are once again powerfully challenged” (KAGAN, 2009, p. 97). This does not, he argues, mean that liberal democracies should cease engaging or trading with nondemocratic powers. Indeed, cooperation on matters of mutual interest is advisable. His warning, however, is that because national interests are shaped in part by the nature of domestic regimes, democracies must unite to confront competition from nondemocratic powers. He also advocates continued democratic promotion of liberal values in order to transfer “power from the few to the many” (KAGAN, 2009, pp. 101–102).
About the Author:
Robert Kagan is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a columnist for The Washington Post. The author of several books, he served in the U.S. Department of State from 1984 to 1988.
Publication Details
Title:The Return of History and the End of Dreams
Author:Robert Kagan
Publisher:CASA DAS LETRAS
Language:Portuguese
E-book:105 pages
ASIN:B009B0I1IS