When they launched a military campaign against Iran (external link) on February 28, 2026 (external link), the United States and Israel pursued four objectives stated by Washington: preventing Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon; degrading missile production; curtailing Iranian support for Hezbollah and Hamas; and fostering regime change led by the Iranians themselves.
Six months later, the results fall far short of these goals. The strikes killed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (external link), the country’s leader for 16 years, and destroyed ships, air defenses, and parts of the nuclear infrastructure. Mojtaba Khamenei, his son and successor, consolidated the Revolutionary Guard’s control over the state and prepared the country for a prolonged conflict. The diplomatic track remained open, but under steeper demands, ultimately strengthening the regime Washington intended to weaken.
However, the actions of the United States triggered an unprecedented geoeconomic event in recent history: the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, through which one-fifth of the global energy supply (external link) flowed. The disruption curtailed flows of oil, gas, naphtha, and fertilizers. Natural gas exports fell by 95% (external link), driving up freight rates, insurance, and costs (external link) across the entire supply chain.
Half a year on, the American and Israeli strikes planned to weaken Tehran have ultimately inflicted losses on consumers, businesses, and America’s own allies.
The Lessons of General Clausewitz
Prussian general, strategist, and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) (external link), one of the most influential thinkers in Western military history, offers a key to understanding this contrast: the concept of “center of gravity” (external link)—the primary source of strength and cohesion upon which a country’s ability to sustain a war depends. In the case of the United States, this center of gravity combines economic performance, allied confidence, and voter support.
By blockading the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran struck at all three dimensions—rising gasoline prices, partners’ distrust, and dwindling public support for the war began eroding, from within, the political foundation sustaining Trump’s leadership.
This strategy mirrors Andrew Mack’s (1939–2021) (external link) classic explanation of asymmetric warfare. According to Mack, an international relations scholar, the disparity in military power can be offset by the disparity in interest and tolerance for the costs of conflict.
For Tehran, the war involves regime survival and is therefore an existential matter. For Washington, its continuation depends primarily on political and electoral calculations. Iran’s strategy is thus to endure until the wear and tear caused by the conflict—such as fuel price hikes and declining government popularity—outweighs the United States’ willingness to keep fighting.
The shifting rhetoric in Washington itself supports this interpretation. In August, Vice President J.D. Vance went so far as to frame lowering energy prices as the administration’s “number one objective (external link),” ahead of non-proliferation itself.
In this context, Trump’s approval rating fell from 40% to 33% (external link), and only 31% of Americans approve of the war. A gallon of gasoline, which cost $2.98 (external link) before the strikes, surpassed $4 (external link)—and the promise to avoid new wars, once a winning card for the president, began to be turned against him.
The military cost has also grown: eighteen Americans have died and 756 were wounded (external link). The expenditure of Patriot and THAAD interceptors depleted stockpiles (external link) and shifted assets from Europe and the Indo-Pacific, narrowing the margin to simultaneously sustain European defense, Asian deterrence, and a presence in the Gulf.
For Japan and South Korea, this compounded their dependence on energy transiting Hormuz. In Japan, this vulnerability was one of the factors behind the decision to bring forward to fiscal year 2025 (external link) the target of allocating 2% of GDP to defense. The projected budget for 2026 stands at 9 trillion yen (external link). The country is also discussing, still inconclusively, the constitutional recognition of the Self-Defense Forces (external link).
In the Gulf, American bases failed to prevent attacks and turned their hosts into targets. Yet this did not lead these countries to sever ties with Washington. These governments combine military cooperation, missile defense, and direct dialogue with Tehran. Qatar is mediating negotiations alongside Oman and Pakistan for the reopening of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia is diversifying its security guarantees through the Mecca Agreement (external link), while the UAE deepens the Abraham Accords—differing responses to the same uncertainty over how far American protection extends.
Different Assumptions and Timelines
For Iran, surviving does not equate to winning. The bombings exacerbated inflation, shortages, and poverty—food inflation reached 128% (external link) in July. The war also strengthened the Revolutionary Guard, narrowing President Pezeshkian’s diplomatic maneuverability.
The death of Ali Khamenei and the rise of the military core reinforced, within Iranian internal debate, the argument that only a bomb would deter further intervention—the exact opposite of the non-proliferation sought by Washington.
The IAEA has not even been able to verify the whereabouts of 440 kilograms of uranium (external link) enriched to 60%, and the so-called breakout time—the time required to convert this stockpile into an operational nuclear weapon—remains estimated at between nine months and a year (external link).” For the Revolutionary Guard, the bomb ceases to be a bargaining chip and becomes an instrument of deterrence against external threats. It is an insurance policy against an existential threat and, therefore, a condition for regime survival.”
The war is likely to remain in a stalemate, characterized by an American blockade, partial Iranian control over Hormuz, skirmishes, intermittent bombings, and threats of escalation. Even a negotiated resolution is unlikely to restore the pre-conflict conditions of free passage. Tehran has turned control of the route into an instrument of power and is unlikely to relinquish it without concessions.
An agreement could provide for joint navigation management between Iran and Oman, third-party demining, and service fee collection under international oversight, alongside nuclear inspections, enrichment limits, and sanctions relief—a set of conditions that neither party has accepted so far.
The war thus confirms another of Clausewitz’s tenets: that military force is an instrument of politics and must remain subordinate to the objectives it seeks to achieve.
The scenario of this conflict confirms that military superiority without clear political objectives does not translate into a successful outcome. Washington achieved tactical victories, but failed to attain its stated ends. Tehran preserved the regime, but paid in lives, resources, and military capability.
If Washington—conditioned by electoral attrition and the economic costs of the war—reaches its political limit before material pressure forces Tehran to yield, the war will continue to reshape the Gulf order, American alliances, and competition with Beijing. This prolongation transforms the conflict into a contest between two temporalities: the political time of the United States and the material time of Iran.
This article, “Depois de seis meses de guerra, EUA não alcançaram vitória estratégica contra o Irã. O que acontece agora?”, by Alexandre Ramos Coelho, was originally published in The Conversation and is licensed under Creative Commons (CC BY-ND 4.0).